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I. INTRODUCTION
The latter half of the twentieth century saw a marked shift in
the form of legal regulation of the workplace. At mid-century,
unions were at the height of their power in terms of membership
and bargaining strength. The dominant legal model for governing
workplace relations was the one put into place by the Wagner Act
in 1935,' a model promoting collective bargaining. Since then,
however, union strength has steadily eroded, and with it,
collectively bargained agreements as a source of rights for
workers.2  Paralleling this decline has been the growth of
government mandates creating rights in the individual worker.
3
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1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1935).
2. Union membership in the United States has declined steadily since the
mid-1950's. In 1950, 31.6% of the total workforce and 34.6% of the private
sector workforce were union members. By 2004, those figures had declined to
12.5% and 7.9% respectively. The Labor Research Association, Union
Membership: Overall (1948-2004) and Union Membership: Private Sector
(1948-2004), available at http://www.laborresearch.org/econ-stats.php (last
visited May 6, 2006).
3. For example, Congress has enacted laws prohibiting certain forms of
discrimination. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (2000); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000); Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (regulating
employer provision of pensions and other fringe benefits); Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2000) (establishing basic safety standards in
the workplace); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601
(2000) (requiring the provision of unpaid family and medical leave to certain
workers). In addition, state courts and legislatures have recognized or enacted a
variety of other legal rights protecting the individual employee against perceived
overreaching by the employer.
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This shift-from collective bargaining to individual employee
rights as the primary source of legal regulation-has been both
applauded and decried by observers and legal scholars. Some
commentators have argued that the shift is a positive one, claiming
that government mandated minimum standards more reliably
protect workers' interests while avoiding the inefficiencies and
costs of granting monopoly status to unions.4 Others lament the
decline of collective bargaining, asserting that unions are necessary
for effective protection of individual workers' interests and arguing
that the participatory governance ideals inherent in the scheme of
collective bargaining have independent value.
5
This Comment asks what difference it makes to think about
workers' rights under a collective as opposed to an individual
rights model in a particular context: that of protecting employee
privacy. More specifically, it undertakes an examination of the
range of disputes between employers and employees over
workplace drug testing in the late 1980's and the 1990's, focusing
on the differences between cases brought with union involvement
and those brought by individual workers acting alone. In doing so,
it asks how collective forms of disputing about drug testing
differed from individual approaches, and whether these differences
affected the ability of workers to assert and protect their interests
in personal privacy.
The law review literature has focused primarily on the legality
of workplace drug testing, emphasizing a handful of highly salient
cases. This Comment takes a different approach. It looks beyond
the major cases to a broader range of disputes about drug testing.
The purpose of this Comment is not to argue for or against the
legality of drug testing, but rather to understand how collective
approaches to contesting employer policies looked different from
individual rights based claims. The examination here is
exploratory rather than definitive, as it is based primarily on
publicly available court and National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) decisions, which may not be representative of all
disputes. What it suggests is that unions were far more likely than
individual litigants to bring broad-based challenges intended to
4. Charles Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations:
Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law and its Prospects, 51 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1012 (1984).
5. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The
Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective
Bargaining System, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 575 (1992).
6. See Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue, III, Studying the Iceberg from
its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment
Discrimination Cases, 24 Law & Soc'y Rev. 1133 (1990).
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benefit the workforce as a whole; however, their ability and
willingness to do so appeared to depend heavily on both the legal
and the bargaining environment. Over time, union-initiated
challenges increasingly focused on the application of drug testing
policies to particular workers rather than class-wide challenges.
Union involvement also influenced how these challenges were
framed in legal terms. Disputes channeled through the collective
bargaining system emphasized workers' interests in job security,
while an individual rights approach more often framed the issue in
dignitary terms, alleging claims such as invasion of privacy,
defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress. And
although individual litigants occasionally obtained damage awards,
they primarily brought after-the-fact challenges to the
implementation of drug testing policies rather than seeking
prospective, class-wide relief.
II. THE EXPANSION OF WORKPLACE DRUG TESTING
Drug testing provides a useful case study for exploring the
differences between collective and individual approaches to
protecting employee privacy because its implementation followed
a fairly clear trajectory. Prior to the mid-1980's, employee drug
testing was a non-issue because only a trivial proportion of the
workforce was subjected to such testing.7 Then, with President
Ronald Reagan's announced War on Drugs in the mid-1980's, the
use of urinalysis drug testing in the employment setting exploded.
In 1986, President Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12564,
declaring a "drug-free federal workplace" and directing the head of
each federal agency to "develop a plan for achieving the objective
of a drug-free workplace" and to "establish a program to test for
the use of illegal drugs by employees in sensitive positions.
8
Within a short period of time, drug testing became a standard
feature of federal government employment. Following President
Reagan's Executive Order, the use of drug testing in the private
sector also expanded rapidly. In 1987, 21.5% of major U.S. firms
surveyed reported that they conducted some form of employee
7. The technology permitting drug testing of urine and other bodily fluids
existed in the early 1970's, but its use was mostly confined to the forensic and
medical contexts. Under the Influence?: Drugs and the American Work Force
178 (Jacques Normand, Richard 0. Lempert & Charles P. O'Brien eds., 1994).
The United States armed forces first began to implement large-scale drug testing
beginning in the 1970's and the practice spread to private industry in the 1980's.
Id.
8. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7301(1), 7301(2)(a) (1986).
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drug testing.9 This figure trended steadily upward, reaching a peak
of 81.1% of large firms surveyed in 1996.1 Some of these firms
were compelled to adopt drug testing programs because of new
federal regulations mandating testing in industries such as railroads
and trucking. Many others began to implement drug testing
programs voluntarily, moved by the example of the federal
government or the exhortation of political leaders.
The drarhatic expansion of drug testing in the workplace did
not occur without controversy. The growth of urinalysis testing of
employees provoked both legal challenges and critical
commentary. Critics of workplace drug testing framed their
concerns primarily in terms of the threat to personal privacy and
autonomy, identifying a number of ways in which the process of
urinalysis drug testing infringed upon workers' interests. 1 First,
they argued that the process of collecting urine samples implicates
workers' interest in their bodily privacy. As observed by Charles
Fried, "the excretory functions are shielded by more or less
absolute privacy, so much so that situations in which this privacy is
violated are experienced as extremely distressing, as detracting
from one's dignity and self esteem."12 Because of concerns about
adulterated samples, some testing protocols call for monitoring or
direct observation of the act of urination, a requirement that
obviously increases the intrusiveness of the procedure.
Second, drug testing may infringe workers' interests in
maintaining the privacy of sensitive medical information. Because
the metabolites of certain prescription or over-the-counter drugs
are similar to those produced by illegal drug use, those tested are
typically asked to list all medications taken in the recent past to
assist the testing personnel in interpreting the results of a positive
9. American Management Association, 1996 AMA Survey: Workplace
Drug Testing and Drug Abuse Policies 1 (1996).
10. Id. Subsequent AMA surveys suggest that testing by major U.S. firms
declined after 2001. See American Management Association, 2001 AMA
Survey on Workplace Testing: Medical Testing (2001).
11. See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values, and
the Law, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 221 (1996); Craig M. Cornish & Donald B.
Louria, Employment Drug Testing, Preventive Searches, and the Future of
Privacy, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 95 (1991); Jonathan V. Holtzman, Applicant
Testing for Drug Use: A Policy and Legal Inquiry, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 47
(1991); Kevin B. Zeese, Drug Testing Here to Stay?, 12 Geo. Mason L. Rev.
545 (1990); Heidi P. Mallory, Note, Fourth Amendment--the "Reasonableness"
of Suspicionless Drug Testing of Railroad Employees, 80 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 1052, 1080 (1990); Marion Crain, Expanded Employee Drug-
Detection Programs and the Public Good: Big Brother at the Bargaining Table,
64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1286, 1333 (1989).
12. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L.J. 475, 487 (1968).
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drug screen.' 3 Such disclosures, as well as the chemical testing
itself, may reveal a great deal of information about the health and
medical condition of an individual. The employee's interest in
controlling sensitive medical information may also be implicated if
the employer or testing laboratory does not maintain adequate
control over the information in order to maintain its confidentiality.
Finally, drug testing may reveal information about an employee's
off-duty activities. Urinalysis testing detects drug metabolites-
biochemical products produced by the body in response to certain
substances-that remain present in the body well past the time of
exposure.' 4 As a result, an individual may test positive for certain
drugs days or even weeks after exposure, long after any
psychoactive effects have disappeared.
Workplace drug testing raised other concerns beyond privacy
for employees and their advocates. Much of the early debate
focused on the accuracy of the tests and how positive results
should be interpreted. Commentators pointed out that the validity
of test results might be compromised by sample adulteration or
poor laboratory quality, and that false positives were inevitable. 15
The problem of false positives is exacerbated when the base rate of
actual positives in the tested population is low-as is likely when
employees in a largely drug-free workplace are tested randomly
rather than on the basis of individualized suspicion. 16 Moreover,
positive test results require interpretation. The presence of drug
metabolites might indicate illegal drug use or exposure to a legal
substance that produces similar metabolites in the body. And a
positive result does not indicate when and how much of a drug was
ingested or whether the individual was impaired. 17  The
implementation of these policies also raised concerns about
increased employer power. Because drug testing is a coercive
procedure that can be used to justify discharge, an employer could
deploy it in a manner that discriminates against disfavored groups,
including racial minorities or union activists, or that simply
discourages workers from speaking out about workplace concerns.
Thus, employees had an interest in influencing how positive results
would be interpreted and what consequences would follow from
13. See Edward M. Chen, Pauline T. Kim & John M. True, Common Law
Privacy: A Limit on an Employer's Power to Test for Drugs, 12 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 651, 673 (1990).
14. See id. at 674.
15. See, e.g., id. at 679; Mark A. Rothstein, Workplace Drug Testing: A
Case Study in the Misapplication of Technology, 5 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 65
(1991).
16. Chen, supra note 13, at 688-89.
17. See Under the Influence?, supra note 7, at 193.
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such a result-for example, whether termination is automatic or
employees are afforded an opportunity for retesting, and whether
an individual's past work history is relevant in determining the
sanction.
Of course, employers who adopted drug testing policies
believed they were justified in doing so, arguing that testing
ensured workplace safety, promoted productivity and deterred
illegal drug use, and that these legitimate interests outweighed any
resulting burden on employees' rights. 18  The purpose of this
Comment is not to revisit the extensive debates about whether or
under what conditions employee drug testing is constitutional or
fair to workers, or whether it constitutes a wise policy. Instead, it
takes as a starting point the fact that workplace drug testing was
highly contested at the outset, and examines how employee
concerns about its implementation played out in formal legal
disputes.
III. CONTESTING WORKPLACE DRUG TESTING
A. The Leading Cases
In the mid-1980's, as employers began implementation of drug
testing programs, employees or their representatives instituted a
number of court cases challenging these policies. Because much
of the early testing was undertaken by public employers, or as the
result of federal mandates, the early cases most often raised
constitutional challenges, alleging that the testing violated
workers' Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable
searches. This early litigation produced mixed results regarding
the constitutionality of workplace drug testing; however, courts
generally agreed that the testing implicated important privacy
interests.19 Some courts emphasized the intrusiveness of urine
18. See, e.g., Scott S. Cairns & Carolyn V. Grady, Drug Testing in the
Workplace: A Reasoned Approach for Private Employers, 12 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 491 (1990); Kenneth B. Noble, Issue and Debate: Should Employers Be
Able to Test for Drug Use?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1986, at B7 ("Employers
argue that drug-using employees often develop medical problems that can result
in increased use of sick leave and health benefits and, ultimately, high insurance
premiums.").
19. See, e.g., Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
amended by 878 F.2d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing cases and agreeing that
mandatory urinalysis is a "search" implicating the Fourth Amendment because it
entails government action that infringes a "reasonable expectation of privacy");
Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1542-43 (6th Cir.), vacated by
861 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding strong privacy interests in act of
urinating and in information that can be gleaned from urine analysis); Capua v.
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tests, which required monitoring or even directly observing the act
of urination. 20 Other courts emphasized the potential for revealing
information about employees' off-duty activities. For example, the
District of Columbia Circuit found that urinalysis testing "may
provide Government officials with a periscope through which they
can peer into an individual's behavior in her private life, even in
her own home." 21 Similarly, a district court judge in 1986
characterized urinalysis as a "form of surveillance" which "reports
on a person's off-duty activities just as surely as someone had been
present and watching." 22 Although agreeing that urinalysis drug
testing constituted a "search" implicating the Fourth Amendment,
courts disagreed over how to balance employer interests in testing
against employee interests in privacy.
Then, in 1989, the Supreme Court decided two high profile
cases-Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association.3 and
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab -that directly
addressed the constitutionality of drug tests under the Fourth
Amendment. Skinner involved a challenge to the constitutionality
of regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) requiring drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees
25involved in a major train accident. Von Raab addressed the
United States Customs Service's policy of requiring all employees
transferred or promoted to certain positions to undergo urinalysis
drug tests.26 Covered positions included those directly involved in
drug interdiction, those requiring the incumbent to carry firearms,
and those that entailed handling of "classified" material.2
The Supreme Court in Skinner unambiguously recognized that
the drug tests implicated significant privacy interests. It held that
both the physical intrusion entailed in obtaining a blood sample,
City of Plainfeld, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D.N.J. 1986) (finding that "urine
testing involves one of the most private functions").
20. See, e.g., Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1542-43; Nat'l Treasury Employee
Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), affid in part and vacated in
part, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
21. Jones, 833 F.2d at 340.
22. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1511.
23. 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
24. 489 U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
25. 489 U.S. at 609, 109 S. Ct. at 1409. The regulations also authorized, but
did not require, railroads to conduct breath or urine tests in the event of specified
rule violations or upon the "reasonable suspicion" of a supervisor that an
employee was impaired due to drug or alcohol use. Id. at 611, 109 S. Ct. at
1410.
26. 489 U.S. at 660-61, 109 S. Ct. at 1388.
27. Id.
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and the visual or aural monitoring of the act of urination required
under the regulations infringed "expectations of privacy that•- ,,28
society has long recognized as reasonable. Because testing
bodily fluids "can reveal a host of private medical facts about an
employee, including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or
diabetic," the Court found that the ensuing chemical analysis
constituted a further invasion of privacy, and concluded that these
intrusions "must be deemed searches under the Fourth
Amendment.,, 29  The Court noted, however, that the Fourth
Amendment proscribes only unreasonable searches and seizures.
Emphasizing the safety-sensitive nature of the railroad workers'
jobs and the pervasive regulation of the railroad industry to ensure
safety, the Court held that the government's "compelling" interest
in testing without individualized suspicion outweighed the
workers' interests in privacy. The Court reached a similar
conclusion in Von Raab, referring to a "veritable national crisis"
caused by the smuggling of illegal drugs, and finding that the
Government had a compelling interest in ensuring that "front-line
interdiction personnel are physically fit, and have unimpeachable
integrity and judgment., 31
Although upholding the testing in large part, the Supreme
Court unambiguously framed the debate over drug testing as
implicating privacy interests. Quoting a Fifth Circuit opinion, the
Court described the burden imposed by the sample collection
process:
There are few activities in our society more personal or
private than the passing of urine. Most people describe it
28. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617, 109 S. Ct. at 1413.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 633, 109 S. Ct. at 1422.
31. 489 U.S. at 668, 670, 109 S. Ct. at 1392-93. The Court also held that
the government had a legitimate safety interest in preventing the promotion of
drug users to positions requiring the carrying of firearms. It concluded that the
privacy interests of drug-interdiction personnel and those who carry firearms on
the job were outweighed by the government's interests "in safety and in the
integrity of our border." Id. at 672, 109 S. Ct. at 1394. The Court, however,
remanded the issue of the reasonableness of testing employees who handle
classified materials. Although agreeing that the government has a compelling
interest in protecting "truly sensitive information," the Court expressed
skepticism that all the employees subject to testing under this rationale in fact
had access to such information. Id. at 677-78, 109 S. Ct. at 1397. Categories of
employees to be tested included "Accountant," "Accounting Technician,"
"Animal Caretaker," "Attorney," "Baggage Clerk," "Co-op Student," "Electric
Equipment Repairer," "Mail Clerk/Assistant," and "Messenger." Id. at 678, 109
S. Ct. at 1397. The Court therefore remanded the case to the Court of Appeals
to determine whether the category of employees was too broadly defined. Id.
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by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function
traditionally performed without public observation; indeed,
its performance in public is generally prohibited by law as
well as social custom.
32
In addition to bodily privacy, the Skinner court found that the
revelation of "a host of private medical facts about an employee"
through chemical analysis of urine also constituted a "search"
under the Fourth Amendment. 33  The dissenting Justices in
particular emphasized the dignitary harms threatened by urinalysis
testing. In his dissent in Skinner, Justice Thurgood Marshall
decried the "mass governmental intrusions upon the integrity of the
human body that the majority allows to become reality," arguing
that the decision will ultimately "reduce the privacy all citizens
may enjoy." 34 Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting in Von Raab,
found urinalysis drug testing to be "a type of search particularly
destructive of privacy and offensive to personal dignity. ' 35 Given
the absence of any evidence of drug use among Customs Service
employees, he concluded that the Customs Service testing program
was "a kind of immolation of 3 privacy and human dignity in
symbolic opposition to drug use."
Despite the clear recognition of a privacy interest in Skinner
and Von Raab, those decisions made it more difficult for workers
to challenge drug testing policies under the Fourth Amendment by
accepting as compelling justifications the employers' asserted
interests in safety in Skinner and in the "integrity" of the Customs
Service in Von Raab. Prior to those decisions, published federal
courts of appeals' decisions addressing Fourth Amendment
challenges to workplace drug testing were evenly split.37  By
32. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617, 109 S. Ct. at 1413 (citing Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987), affd in part
and vacated in part, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 655, 109 S. Ct. at 1433 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35. 489 U.S. at 680, 109 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 681, 109 S. Ct. at 1399.
37. Courts of appeals found the employer's testing policies constitutional in
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987),
aff'd in part and vacated in part, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989);
Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d 133 (3d
Cir. 1988); and Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987), amended by
878 F.2d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Courts of appeals upheld employee challenges
to such policies in Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir.),
vacated by 861 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir. 1988); Penny v. Kennedy, 846 F.2d 1563
(6th Cir.), vacated by 862 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1988); and Ry. Labor Exec. Ass'n
v. Bumley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988) rev'd, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402
(1989).
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contrast, in the years following the Court's decisions in Skinner
and Von Raab, the courts of appeals overwhelmingly upheld
government drug policies in the face of Fourth Amendment
challenges.
38
B. A More Systematic Look at the Cases
Despite the considerable attention they received, Skinner and
Von Raab were not representative of the bulk of legal disputes over
employer drug testing. Those cases sought class-wide, injunctive
relief based on a Fourth Amendment challenge. Most drug testing
disputes, however, involved individual workers impacted by their
employer's mandatory testing policies. Moreover, the
constitutional claims raised in Skinner and Von Raab were not
generally available to workers in the private sector.39  Private
employees who wanted to challenge drug testing policies had to
rely on common law or statutory claims, and if they were
unionized, the remedies available through the collective bargaining
system.
38. For example, in all eight reported courts of appeals' decisions in 1989
which followed Skinner and Von Raab and involved broad Fourth Amendment
challenges to employer drug testing policies, the employer prevailed on appeal,
either outright or because the appellate court significantly narrowed the scope of
an injunction issued by the district court in the case. See Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union v. Bush, 891 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting challenge to
constitutionality of executive order mandating random urinalysis drug testing of
federal workers in sensitive positions); Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th
Cir. 1989) (vacating as overbroad an injunction issued by the district court
enjoining mandatory drug testing of correctional officers); American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding
mandatory, suspicionless drug testing of Department of Transportation
employees constitutional); Transp. Workers Union v. SEPTA, 884 F.2d 709 (3d
Cir. 1989) (upholding constitutionality of random testing of transportation
employees); Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (vacating in part lower court injunction barring mandatory drug testing of
Army's civilian employees); Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1989)
(holding constitutional random drug testing of civilian employees at chemical
weapons plant); Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(modifying injunction to permit random drug testing of certain Department of
Justice employees); Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding
police department's random drug testing rule). Similar results persisted
throughout the 1990's.
39. An exception exists when a private party acts "as an instrument or
agent" of the government. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989). For example, in Skinner, the drug testing at tissue
was conducted by private railroads, but it occurred with the Government's
encouragement, endorsement, and participation such that the Fourth Amendment
protections applied. Id.
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This section examines the range of legal disputes surrounding
drug testing, regardless of the legal theory relied on. It considers
both court cases and NLRB cases involving disputes over
workplace drug testing policies, asking whether cases initiated by
unions differed from individual suits in terms of how the employee
interests are framed and what relief was sought. In terms of relief,
some cases primarily involved disputes over the application of an
employer's drug testing policy to a particular individual or handful
of individuals. Such cases sought reinstatement or damages as
remedies for the affected workers, but did little for other
employees in the workforce. Other cases explicitly sought
declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a group of workers,
requesting that a court find a particular testing policy unlawful and
enjoin its implementation. If granted, such relief would affect the
conditions of employment of the entire workforce, or category of
workers subject to testing, not merely the individuals who brought
the suit.
Importantly, this distinction between cases seeking individual
relief and those raising workforce-wide challenges did not
necessarily coincide with the presence or participation of a union
in the litigation. Individual litigants sometimes brought suits
seeking class-wide prospective relief against employer-mandated
drug tests, and unions often represented individual members
challenging the application of a drug testing policy to them. The
following sections discuss the types of legal challenges observed in
union and non-union settings.
1. The Union Setting
When unions were involved, they brought both cases seeking
class-wide relief and those raising only individual claims of harm.
Suits involving workforce-wide challenges were comprised of two
main types. Many, like Skinner and Von Raab, involved
prospective challenges to enjoin implementation of drug testing
programs on the grounds that they violated the Fourth Amendment.
Other cases sought to force employers to bargain with the union or
to submit disputes over drug testing to arbitration prior to
implementation. 4° Unions also brought a considerable number of
individual grievances challenging the application of drug testing
policies. These disputes typically involved an individual employee
40. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp., 491 U.S. 299, 109 S. Ct. 2477
(1989); United Steelworkers v. ASARCO, Inc., 970 F.2d 1448 (5th Cir. 1992);
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l. Union v. Amoco Oil Co., 885 F.2d 697
(10th Cir. 1989).
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terminated after refusing to take a drug test or testing positive.4 1
The union pursued a grievance on behalf of the worker, claiming
that the discharge violated the "just cause" provision of the
collective bargaining agreement.
Over time, the types of legal challenges brought by unions
appear to have shifted considerably. In the earlier years-from the
mid 1980's to early 1990's-workforce-wide challenges
dominated the federal court litigation in which unions were
involved. Over time, however, disputes brought on behalf of
individual union members appear to have become much more
numerous. For example, from 1986 to 1990, out of thirty-two
publicly available federal appeals court decisions involving
workplace drug testing challenges by unions, twenty-seven
involved workforce-wide claims seeking to enjoin implementation
of employer drug testing policies or to compel employers to
bargain over the issue. Among similar cases reported from 1996 to
2000, in only three of nineteen such suits sought any kind of broad
relief-the rest involved the individual grievances of one or a
handful of union members.
Of course, examining only publicly available courts of appeals
decisions runs the risk of presenting a distorted picture of the
actual pattern of disputes.4 Cases may settle before a formal
opinion is issued, or the parties may decide not to appeal. It is
plausible, however, that unions shifted their emphasis from
workforce-wide to individual cases over this period of time. In the
1980's, the issue of drug testing was a novel one and the very
purpose of the early cases was to establish some legal precedent
regarding the permissibility of drug testing. As more courts issued
decisions and the law became more settled, lawsuits would be less
necessary to resolve disputes over the permissible scope of drug
testing. In addition, a reduced emphasis on class challenges would
be a rational response on the part of unions to signals from the
federal courts about their receptivity to broad policy challenges to
employer drug testing policies. As discussed above, following
Skinner and Von Raab, the federal courts of appeals became
noticeably less sympathetic to Fourth Amendment challenges to
workplace drug testing policies.
In addition, as testing policies became more common, greater
numbers of workers were tested and more opportunities existed for
individual disputes to arise. In the context of a collective
bargaining agreement, most individual disputes are unlikely to
41. See e.g., Local 238 v. Cargill, Inc., 66 F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 1995); Gulf
Coast Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Co., 001 F. 2d 244 (5th Cir. 1998).
42. See Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 6.
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produce a judicial opinion or even result in a formal court filing.
These claims would initially be processed through the non-public
grievance arbitration system established by the collective
bargaining agreement. The vast majority of such disputes would
be resolved somewhere along the way through this system, and
only in rare instances would either party seek review of an
arbitration decision in court. The fact that a number of individual
grievances are reported in federal appeals court decisions in the
1990's suggests the existence of a much larger number of such
individual disputes that never reached the courts. Thus, although
the precise proportions are uncertain, an actual shift in emphasis
from workforce-wide challenges to the processing of individual
disputes likely occurred in the union context.
Looking at litigated court cases, however, omits another
important form of potential collective resistance to employer-
mandated drug testing. In many workplaces, the issue of drug
testing was addressed primarily through the collective bargaining
process rather than litigation. In Johnson-Bateman, decided in
1989, the NLRB ruled that drug and alcohol testing is a mandatory
subject of bargaining, and that therefore implementation of such a
program by an employer without first bargaining with the union is
an unfair labor practice. 43 The NLRB found that a newly-imposed
requirement of drug and alcohol testing for employees who
required medical treatment for on-the-job injuries was plainly
"germane to the working environment" and that the union had not
waived its right to bargain over such a change. Thus, the collective
bargaining process at least offered the potential for workers to
raise objections on a collective basis to employer-imposed drug
testing policies, and to address issues such as which workers would
be subject to testing, how and when tests would be conducted, and
what consequences would follow a positive result.
How unions actually dealt with the issue of drug testing in the
negotiation process is clearly important for understanding
collective approaches to protecting employee privacy; however,
exploring that question is beyond the scope of this Comment.
Whether or not unions succeeded in protecting workers' privacy
interests when negotiating contracts, it is clear that the collective
bargaining process affected the way in which disputes over drug
testing were framed. In finding that drug and alcohol testing was
germane to the working environment, the NLRB in Johnson-
Bateman emphasized workers' economic interests. The NLRB
characterized the testing policy as a substantial change in the
"mode of the investigation" and "the character of proof on which
43. 295 N.L.R.B. 180 (1989).
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an employee's job security might depend."44 Thus, the NLRB's
decision that drug and alcohol testing is a mandatory subject of
bargaining turned on its finding that such testing has "potentially
serious implications "a5 for employee's job security. Nowhere in
Johnson-Bateman does the NLRB mention the concept of privacy
or suggest that employer-mandated testing threatens any dignitary
interests distinct from workers' interests in retaining their jobs.
Other court and NLRB cases addressing the duty to bargain over
drug testing policies also speak in terms of job security, not
privacy. 6
Similarly, individual grievances processed under collective
bargaining agreements focused on protecting job security, rather
than redressing any dignitary harm resulting from invasive testing
practices. These grievances typically challenged discipline or
discharge imposed after-the-fact-that is, after a worker had tested
positive or refused to submit to testing-and sought restoration of
the affected worker's job status through remedies of reinstatement
and back pay. Often, the outcome of the grievance turned on such
issues as whether the employer followed the procedures laid out in
an agreed-upon testing policy, whether the chain of custody over
the tested sample was broken, or whether a refusal to provide a
sample was justified under certain circumstances. These cases
tended not to address such issues as the intrusiveness of the
procedures or whether a worker suffered dignitary harm. This lack
of attention to workers' privacy and dignitary interests is consistent
with the fact that arbitrators rarely award money damages to
workers except to compensate for lost wages.47 The effect,
however, was to frame individual worker grievances about drug
testing, like the bargaining issue, in terms of job security rather
than privacy.
2. Individual Cases
Apart from the cases initiated by unions, workers acting alone
or with a few others also brought a number of challenges to
workplace drug testing policies. Although individual employees
occasionally brought actions seeking to enjoin testing for an entire
44. Id. at 183.
45. Id. at 184.
46. See, e.g., Intrepid Museum Found., Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. 1 (2001); Tocco,
Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 480 (1997).
47. Clyde W. Summers, Individualism, Collectivism, and Autonomy in
American Labor Law, 5 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 453 (2001).
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category of workers,48 the overwhelming majority of these suits
sought only individual relief. Most often, as with the individual
grievances pursued by unions, individual employees filed suit only
after they had suffered some job detriment as a result of the
implementation of a drug testing policy-for example, discharge
for testing positive or refusing to submit to testing. These suits
typically sought compensatory and sometimes punitive damages in
addition to reinstatement or recovery of lost wages.
The individual challenges advanced a variety of legal theories.
Public employees often sought damages on the theory that the
particular test they were subjected to violated their Fourth
Amendment or Due Process rights-for example, on the ground
that the employer lacked reasonable suspicion that the worker had
used illegal drugs, or that the worker had not been afforded a
hearing prior to termination.49 In the private sector, employees
relied primarily on common law theories to challenge adverse
employment actions.50  Some directly challenged the intrusion
entailed by testing policies, relying on the common law tort of
invasion of privacy, 1 which imposes liability for an "unreasonable
intrusion upon the seclusion of another" that is "highly offensive to
a reasonable person." 52 Intrusion on seclusion claims were often
accompanied by other claims focusing on dignitary harms such as
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Because virtually all of
the cases involved discharges, the employees also relied on
theories suggesting limitations on the employer's right to terminate
48. See, e.g., Stigile v. Clinton, 110 F.3d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Willner v.
Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga,
846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir.), vacated by 861 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir. 1988); Jennings v.
Minco Tech. Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. App. 1989).
49. See, e.g., Piroglu v. Coleman, 25 F.3d 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Ford v.
Dowd, 931 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir. 1991); Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't,
840 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir. 1988).
50. Some employees brought claims alleging that drug testing was
administered in a manner that discriminated on the basis of race or disability.
See, e.g., Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221
(10th Cir. 1997); Anderson v. Lewis Rail Serv. Co., 868 F.2d 774 (5th Cir.
1989); Chaney v. S. Ry. Co., 847 F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1988). In a few states,
workers were able to rely on state constitutional privacy protections. See, e.g.,
Webster v. Motorola, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 203 (Mass. 1994); Luck v. S. Pac.
Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Cal. App. 1990); Semore v. Pool, 266 Cal. Rptr
280 (Cal. App. 1990).
51. See, e.g., Kelley v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 849 F.2d 41 (1st Cir.
1988); Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11 (N.J. 1992);
Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989); Jennings
v. Ninco Tech. Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. App. 1989).
52. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652A, 652B (1977).
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the employment. Thus, individual plaintiffs often alleged that their
employer's actions breached a contract providing job security or
promising to respect their privacy, or that they had been discharged
in violation of public policy.
53
Because of the common law presumption that employment for
an indefinite period is on an "at-will" basis, 54 the employee
discharged as a result of a drug testing policy faced an uphill
battle. Very few workers in the private sector have contracts
specifying a term of employment or guaranteeing job security.
Unlike union employees who are typically protected by the
collective bargaining agreement against discharge without "just
cause," the non-union employee had fewer bases on which to
challenge their employer's actions. Under a just cause standard,
the employer's right to discipline is limited to work-related
conduct and must be roportional to the offense in light of the
worker's past history. Thus, a unionized worker discharged for a
positive drug test could argue that it did not reveal any on-the-job
impairment or that discharge was an excessive penalty given a long
history of satisfactory work performance. In the absence of a
contractual limitation on the employer's right to discharge without
cause, however, those arguments were simply unavailable to the
non-union private sector employee. As a result, suits by non-union
employees tended to focus on the dignitary harms threatened by
drug testing, rather than the fairness of the penalty. One common
argument was that discharges based on a drug testing policy fell
within an exception to the at-will rule because they violated the
public policy protecting employees' rights to privacy and freedom
from unreasonable searches. 56 Similarly, claims of breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing were often
premised on the argument that employer testing that violated
employee privacy constituted a bad faith breach.57 Thus, even the
contract and wrongful discharge claims of non-union employees
were often framed in terms of privacy interests.
53. See, e.g., Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1992);
Gilmore v. Enogex, Inc., 878 P.2d 360 (Okla. 1994); Hennessey, 609 A.2d 11;
Luedtke, 768 P.2d 1123; Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. 618.
54. For a more complete discussion of the at-will rule, see Pauline T. Kim,
Bargaining With Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of
Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 105 (1997) and
Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on
Workers' Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 447 (1999).
55. See Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just
Cause" in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 Duke L.J. 594 (1985).
56. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 53.
57. See, e.g., Luedtke, 768 P.2d 1123; Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. 618.
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In a small handful of cases, individual employees achieved
some notable victories. In Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation
Co.,58 a California state court of appeal upheld a jury verdict for
the plaintiff, a computer programmer terminated for refusing to
submit to suspicionless drug testing. The jury had rejected the
employer's argument that Luck's job was "safety-sensitive" and
awarded her damages. Agreeing with this factual conclusion, the
court of appeal upheld the verdict on the grounds that Southern
Pacific's attempt to invade Luck's privacy was unjustified.59 In
another case, a drilling rig employee discharged after testing
positive for marijuana was awarded damages on the grounds that
direct observation of the act of urination by a representative of the
defendant violated the plaintiffs right to privacy and caused him
emotional distress. 6° Despite the success of these plaintiffs in
obtaining damages for dignitary harms, their experience was quite
atypical. In the overwhelming majority of individual challenges to
employer drug testing, courts ruled in favor of the employer,
typically relying on the right to terminate at-will or finding that the
employee's privacy interests were outweighed by the employer's
interest in testing.
6
IV. ASSESSING COLLECTIVE V. INDIVIDUAL APPROACHES TO
PROTECTING EMPLOYEE PRIVACY
What can this examination of legal disputes over drug testing
tell us about the possibilities and limitations of collective as
compared with individual approaches to protecting employee
privacy? Before attempting to sketch out an answer to that
question, a few caveats are necessary. First, this study focuses on
publicly available court opinions and NLRB decisions, and hence,
58. 267 Cal. Rptr. 618.
59. Id. at 633. For a more detailed discussion of the case and its legal
theories, see Pauline T. Kim, The Story of Luck v. Southern Pacific
Transportation: The Struggle to Protect Employee Privacy, in Employment
Law Stories (Foundation Press, forthcoming 2006).
60. See Kelley v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 849 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1988).
61. See, e.g., Rushing v. Hershey Chocolate-Memphis, No. 99-5802, 2000
WL 1597849 (6th Cir. 2000); Anderson v. Exxon Coal U.S.A., Inc., No. 96-
8032, 1997 WL 157378 (10th Cir. 1997); Mares v. Conagra Poultry Co., 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 19806 (10th Cir. 1992); Baggs v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc.,
957 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1992); Home v. J.W. Gibson Well Serv. Co., 894 F.2d
1194 (10th Cir. 1990); Frye v. IBP, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (D. Kan. 1998);
Hart v. Seven Resorts Inc., 947 P.2d 846 (Ariz. 1997); Stein v. Davidson Hotel
Co., 945 S.W.2d 714 (Tenn. 1997); Gilmore v. Enogex, Inc., 878 P.2d 360
(Okla. 1994); Roe v. Quality Transp. Serv., 838 P.2d 128 (Wash. App. 1992);
Jennings v. Minco Tech. Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. App. 1989).
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only on disputes that have resulted in some kind of formal
resolution. As discussed above, much of the resistance to
workplace drug testing is not visible through an examination of
public disputes. Unions may contest particular policies through the
process of private negotiation, seeking to influence the form that a
particular testing program takes, rather than in engaging in high
profile, high stakes litigation. Similarly, individual workers may
resist employer-mandated drug testing not by filing suit, but by
engaging in strategies to "beat" the tests, exiting the workplace, or
avoiding employers that require testing. A different sort of study is
necessary to fully understand these forms of resistance, both
collective and individual.
Another important caveat recognizes that the form taken by
formal legal disputes is significantly constrained and shaped by
existing law. Workers who wished to contest the implementation
of drug testing in the workplace did not have an unlimited array of
theories on which to draw; rather, their arguments were limited and
channeled by existing legal doctrines. For example, non-union
employees in the private sector had to rely primarily on common
law doctrines such as breach of contract or the tort of intrusion on
seclusion, which in many ways were ill-fitting doctrines to address
the core privacy concerns raised by drug testing policies.
Similarly, union challenges to employer drug testing policies were
significantly constrained by existing law governing the collective
bargaining process. Finally, it is important to remember that the
litigation over workplace drug testing described here took place in
a specific social context. The 1980's and 1990's were
characterized by a steady decline in union strength, particularly in
the private sector, and an increasingly conservative federal
judiciary. Thus, examining the experience with drug testing
disputes only shows how collective and individual approaches
actually played out in a particular legal and social context. In
another context-for example, one with a more robust theory of
privacy rights, or with different mechanisms for advancing
collective worker interests-the outcomes observed might be quite
different.
With those caveats in mind, some tentative observations about
collective versus individual approaches to protecting employee
privacy rights are possible. Although privacy has traditionally
been characterized as a personal right, a number of considerations
suggest that workplace privacy raises collective concerns. First,
the legal protection of privacy typically depends upon existing
norms, which reflect collective values and social practices. For
example, in applying the Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches, courts first ask whether a person had a
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"legitimate expectation of privacy" intruded upon by the
government search.62 Cases addressing common law invasion of
privacy claims often undertake a similar inquiry. 63 Determining
the legitimacy of an employee's expectation of privacy often turns
not only on general social norms, but also on the actual practices of
that workplace. Thus, an individual employee's claim may well
rise or fall depending upon the level of privacy afforded other
employees in the same workplace or industry.
In the employment context, employees' interest in privacy
might also be thought of as a type of "local public good." Some
forms of protection-for example, freedom from video
surveillance-are classic "non-excludable goods" in that all
employees will avoid the intrusiveness of such surveillance if the
employer agrees to forgo it, regardless of whether the particular
worker would bargain for such a benefit. In theory, drug testing
differs in that particular workers could be included or excluded
from a testing program, depending upon individual agreements
reached with the employer. As a practical matter, however, the
utility of drug testing policies (excepting perhaps those based
solely on reasonable suspicion) depends upon their application to
workers as a class. Given the costs of establishing and
implementing such policies, employers are unlikely to bargain for
different testing rules for individual employees. Moreover, from
the employee's perspective, individual bargaining about privacy in
general and drug testing in particular is difficult to imagine, given
the enormous signaling problems raised for an individual worker
acting alone in objecting to a drug testing policy. To the extent
that employee privacy rights have characteristics of a "local public
good," individual bargaining is likely to be inefficient.
If it is difficult for the individual to act alone, how does the
presence of a union affect the ability of workers to resist
unwarranted intrusions of privacy? As seen from the examination
of court cases above, unions played an important role in the early
workforce-wide challenges to drug testing policies. Unions
initiated suit in Skinner and Von Raab, the two cases in which the
Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of workplace
drug testing, as well as the overwhelming majority of early
workforce-wide challenges to drug testing policies. Many of these
cases directly asserted the privacy rights of workers, thereby
forcing courts to assess the justifications for policies invading
those rights. Thus, unions appear to offer at least the possibility of
mobilizing a collective response to threats to employee privacy.
62. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987).
63. See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App. 1984).
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The mixed responses of unions likely reflected some level of
ambivalence among their members. In 1989, John Gilliom
conducted a survey of over 800 skilled workers who were
members of a particular union local, and reported that 45% of the
respondents wanted their union to oppose testing, 43% wanted the
union to support it and 12% were undecided. 64 Because the sample
of workers surveyed was limited to a particular union, it is difficult
to know to what extent the results accurately represent the views of
workers generally. Undoubtedly, workers' views will be
influenced by the particulars of their situation: the nature of their
work, whether it involves significant safety risks, and any past
history of drug and alcohol related problems at their workplace.
However, the fact that the members of a particular union could be
so divided over a subject clearly "germane to the working
environment" raises questions about the possibility of addressing
privacy concerns collectively. Perhaps it is incoherent to conceive
of privacy rights in collective terms if the harm experienced as a
result of an intrusion is wholly idiosyncratic. More practically,
union leaders face a dilemma if its own members are deeply
divided on an issue like drug testing, as any course of action they
pursue will create dissatisfaction among a substantial number of
their members. 65 In such a situation, and especially in an era of
declining union strength, a rational strategy for union leadership
might be to bargain for procedural protections to avoid arbitrary
application of drug testing policies rather than opposing the scope
of testing or resisting any implementation at all.
According to Gilliom, the reasons given by the survey
respondents for their opinions suggest the significance of rights
discourse. He found that concern about privacy was by far the
most common reason given among those who opposed drug
testing. 66  Moreover, agreement with statements that employee
drug testing invades privacy and violates constitutional rights
strongly correlated with a respondent's opinion that the union
should oppose testing. 67  Concerns about the accuracy of drug
testing, while widespread, had a much weaker correlation with a
respondent's opinion that the union ought to oppose workplace
64. John Gilliom, Surveillance, Privacy, and the Law: Employee Drug
Testing and the Politics of Social Control 65 (2d ed. 1996).
65. Id. at 153, n.5.
66. Id. at 67. Gilliom reported that out of the 297 respondents who opposed
drug testing and explained their reasons, 48% cited concerns over privacy, 36%
felt testing violated a legal right or entitlement, and 28% and 13% respectively,
were concerned about error and harassment. Id.
67. Id. at 80, Thl. 4.
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testing. 68 Ironically, the union response to drug testing over time
came to emphasize the latter concerns more than the former. As
discussed above, the types of court cases with union involvement
appears to have shifted from high profile suits challenging the
legitimacy of government and employer policies to defending the
rights of individual workers subjected to such policies. While
likely reflecting a rational response on the part of unions to signals
from the courts, this shift in emphasis transformed the discourse
surrounding challenges to workplace drug testing. The early
workforce-wide cases spoke in terms of basic human dignity and
fundamental rights, asking what types of interests were sufficiently
weighty to justify burdening these important rights. By contrast,
the later cases hardly speak at all in terms of privacy or dignity.
Rather, they focus on compliance with procedural safeguards and
the protection of the material interests, for example jobs and
wages, of their members. Workers who felt aggrieved because of
the manner in which a test was administered, or by the
intrusiveness of the test itself, could not recover damages for
dignitary harms, and those who suffered no tangible job loss were
essentially remediless under the collective bargaining system.
Thus, although the presence of a union undoubtedly insured that its
members received procedural protections they otherwise might not
have had and likely worked to check the worst abuses, collective
resistance to mandatory drug testing became routinized over time,
focusing on consistent application of the rules, rather than on
protecting the dignitary and privacy interests of workers.
What about an individual rights model for protecting employee
privacy? As discussed above, individual litigants, in the absence
of a union, are less likely to bring suit seeking workforce-wide
relief. In addition, individual litigants are unlikely to seek any sort
of prospective relief. The vast majority of individual suits involve
after-the-fact challenges to a workplace drug testing policy. The
typical plaintiff has suffered some sort of job-related detriment
such as discipline or termination as a result of a testing policy, and
seeks compensation for her individual losses. Given the incentives
confronting the individual worker, this observation is not
surprising. An employee acting alone has little incentive to step
forward to challenge a proposed policy, even if she perceives it as
intrusive and degrading. If she were to do so, she bears all the risk,
not only of the costs of litigation, but also of incurring her
employer's displeasure, while any potential benefits of challenging
an employer's policies would accrue to her co-workers as well.
The incentives are reversed, however, once a worker has suffered a
68. Id.
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job loss as a result of a workplace drug test. At that point, she
risks very little by advancing a legal claim that an employer's
testing policy violates her privacy rights, and, if she succeeds, she
could potentially recover significant damages. Thus, individual
employees typically advance privacy claims challenging workplace
drug testing policies only after suffering a job loss.
Although the cost-benefit calculus of litigation may look more
attractive to the individual worker after termination, raising the
policy and dignitary concerns that motivate resistance to workplace
drug testing is significantly more difficult in after-the-fact
challenges. Despite the very real possibility that chemical testing
of urine will produce false positives, the worker fired for failing a
drug test suffers from an implicit presumption of guilt. And where
procedural safeguards such as ensuring sample integrity and
permitting split samples are not in place, it is impossible for the
worker to establish that a false positive has occurred in her case.
Regardless of the accuracy of the result in a particular case, the
purpose of bringing suit is typically to challenge the underlying
policy by arguing that the intrusiveness of the drug testing policy
outweighs any legitimate interest the employer has in testing.
Although the worker who tests positive has the greatest incentive
to bring the challenge, the fact that she did test positive will tend to
weight any assessment in favor of the employer's position-after
all, the test has "caught" a drug user.
The worker fired for refusing to submit to drug testing also
faces difficulties. Although not tainted by a positive test result, her
resistance to taking the test naturally raises questions about her
motivation. Under both the Fourth Amendment and the common
law tort of invasion of privacy, the question whether an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy is crucial. Making the case
that a particular testing protocol invades reasonable expectations of
privacy is more difficult if the employee acts alone, while the rest
of her co-workers submit to the test. Of course, it is possible that
none of the other employees has any objection to the testing, and
that the worker has no legitimate expectation of privacy in that
particular context. However, given the enormous signaling
problems faced by individual workers who object to drug testing,
acquiescence cannot necessarily be taken as evidence that the
employees had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the absence
of a collective mechanism for raising privacy concerns.
Despite these difficulties, an individual rights approach to
protecting employee privacy has at least one distinct advantage
over collective challenges, at least under the current legal regime
for collective bargaining. The individual privacy claim, asserting
tort theories or violation of constitutional rights, brings with it the
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possibility of significant damages. As noted above, under
collective bargaining agreements arbitrators generally do not
award damages to redress dignitary harms. Thus, a worker fired
for failing or refusing to take a drug test can grieve the discharge
and seek reinstatement. However, the worker subjected to
demeaning testing conditions who subsequently tested negative
cannot get any meaningful remedy for the dignitary harm suffered
under the current grievance arbitration system. Judging from
published court opinions, individual privacy claims rarely succeed;
nevertheless, the threat of legal liability for invasion of employee
privacy may more effectively discourage unreasonably intrusive
testing practices than the risks posed by individual grievances
under a collective bargaining regime that offers no remedy for
dignitary harm.
V. TRADEOFFS BETWEEN THE Two APPROACHES
The examination undertaken here suggests that collective and
individual approaches to protecting employee privacy do indeed
differ in terms of how disputes are framed and the nature of the
relief afforded. Given those differences, one might argue that
collective and individual approaches to protecting employee
privacy should be viewed as complementary, not competing.
Unions may facilitate broad-based prospective challenges-either
through legal or bargaining processes-to potentially invasive
employer policies, as well as ensuring that any such policies are
not implemented in an arbitrary manner. At the same time,
individual privacy rights play a distinct role by providing redress
when individuals suffer dignitary harms, not merely job
detriments, through invasive employer practices.
The relationship between collective and individual rights,
however, is more complicated, both as a positive and normative
matter. Here, I only sketch out the relevant issues and leave a
fuller treatment for future work. In terms of positive law, the
Supreme Court has interpreted § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act 69 to require preemption of a state law claim if its
resolution "depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining
agreement. ' 70 Thus, individual claims of invasion of privacy are
potentially preempted if the plaintiff is a union member. In the
69. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). Section 301 provides that "[s]uits for
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization... may be
brought in any district court of the United States." Id.
70. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06, 108 S.
Ct. 1877, 1881 (1988).
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early 1990's courts interpreted § 301 broadly, leading Katherine
Stone to conclude that individual privacy challenges to employer
drug testing are nearly always preempted in the union context.7 1
More recently, a couple of courts have found state law privacy
claims not to be preempted, concluding that the mere fact that the
plaintiffs were unionized did not mean that their claims required
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.72  As a
matter of decisional law, then, the manner in which individual
privacy rights interact with collectively bargained agreements
remains unsettled.
Examining the relationship between collective and individual
rights at work raises a deeper question as well-namely, whether
and in what circumstances unions should be permitted to waive the
individual rights of their members. When considering employee
privacy rights, the question is particularly difficult. As Steven
Willborn argues elsewhere in this symposium, the notion of
consent is integral to understanding privacy.73  Privacy rights
protect human dignity and autonomy by granting to the individual
control over whether and under what circumstances others may
access the "territories of the self.' ' 74  Intrusions that are freely
consented to do not inflict dignitary harm, and thus, the law
generally recognizes consent as a defense to a claim of invasion of
privacy. In the workplace, however, reliance on consent to
determine the rights of the parties is troubling. Inequality of
bargaining power and dissatisfaction with the substantive
outcomes that result from individual bargaining have long been
concerns in the employment context-concerns that have
motivated direct regulation of such matters as minimum wages,
overtime pay, workplace health and safety and how pensions are
funded. These same concerns raise doubts about the
"voluntariness" of individual waivers of privacy rights, particularly
when an employee stands to lose a substantial investment in a
71. Stone, supra note 5, at 606-07. Stone reported that her survey of recent
preemption cases "reveals a very broad tendency for courts to preempt
unionized workers' state law claims," and identified "unlawful drug testing
claims" as one of the areas in which individual employee claims are "almost
always preempted." Id. at 607.
72. See Kline v. Security Guards, Inc., 386 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2004); Cramer
v. Consolidated Freightways Inc., 255 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2001).
73. Steven L. Willborn, Consenting Employees: Workplace Privacy and the
Role of Consent, 66 La. L. Rev. 975 (2006).
74. Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment
Relationship, 57 Ohio St. L.J. 671, 696 (1996).
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particular ),ob by refusing to consent to privacy intrusions by an
employer.
But what if a union consents on behalf of its members to
employer testing or surveillance practices that might otherwise be
viewed as intrusive? Should such an agreement extinguish the
privacy claims of its members, even those who strenuously
disagree with the tradeoff made by the union? Or, to put the
question differently, should the privacy claims of union members
be determined solely by reference to the collective bargaining
agreement or do broader social norms remain relevant to
determining workers' reasonable expectations of privacy?76 On
the one hand, the very institution of collective bargaining entails
displacement of individual preferences on the theory that worker
interests are protected by the greater bargaining leverage available
when workers act collectively. Moreover, unions offer the
possibility of mediating the conflict between the employer's
interests in monitoring or testing and the employees' interest in
privacy in a way that takes account of relevant local conditions,
such as the safety risk involved in the work and any past history
(or lack thereof) of substance abuse or performance problems.
Marion Crane has argued that the collective bargaining system
offers a "preferable, more flexible method[] of accommodating
conflicting interests on the drug-testing question," one that may
even be more effective in eliminating workplace drug use.77 In a
similar vein, Stewart Schwab has argued that permitting unions to
broker individual employment rights may benefit both unions and
their members, at least in certain contexts.78 On the other hand,
permitting unions to waive individual privacy rights runs the risk
that unions will not accurately represent the preferences of their
members, or, more to the point, union leadership may act to
advance its own interests at the expense of the interests of
individual members. Whether in fact unions and their members
gain when unions act as brokers of their members' employment
75. Id. at 715-20.
76. This is the normative question which underlines the issue of whether §
301 preempts state law privacy claims. See, e.g., Kline, 386 F.3d 246
(determining whether the plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy did
not require interpreting the collective bargaining agreement; their justifiable
expectations could be determined "simply by considering the conduct [of
defendant] and the facts and circumstances of [the] workplace").
77. See Crain, supra note 11, at 1343.
78. Stewart Schwab, The Union as Broker of Employment Rights 8-9
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Schwab argues that employee
privacy claims are one type of dispute which it may make sense to channel into
the grievance/arbitration system and away from the courts. Id.
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rights depends on whether they get anything when they give up
those rights. Thus, it would be useful to know if unions succeeded
in extracting any value in exchange for the agreeing to mandatory
drug testing programs in the late 1980's and 1990's.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the issue of drug testing may be largely settled as a
legal matter, conflicts between employers' exercise of control in
the workplace and employees' interests in privacy and autonomy
recur constantly. New technologies offer an increasing number of
ways to monitor worker activities both on and off the job, and the
incentives for employers to use these technologies are significant.
Studying the pattern of legal disputes over workplace drug testing
is a first step in understanding how collective approaches differ
from cases in which privacy claims are framed purely in individual
terms. The preliminary exploration in this Comment suggests that
individual privacy rights are not mere substitutes for collective
mechanisms that aggregate worker interests. However, deciding
how collective and individual rights should be coordinated raises
difficult questions requiring further study, including more
empirical work to better understand the tradeoffs involved. The
significance of this inquiry is underscored by the recent trend of
falling union density in the private sector. As that particular form
of collective voice declines, it is important to understand what is
lost, and perhaps, to begin the process of re-imaging how privacy
and other worker interests might best be protected under
alternative regimes.
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